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THE IRS TEA PARTY CONTROVERSY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
Lily Kahngj
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has no choice but to
exercise discretion in administering the tax law. It oversees a vast
system that affects nearly everyone. The law is often hideously
complex' and sometimes requires the IRS to draw impossibly fine
lines.2 The IRS must also make choices about how to allocate its
limited resources when interpreting, applying, and enforcing the law.
To perform its Augean task with constrained resources, the IRS must
be allowed to exercise discretion.
Having accorded the IRS some amount of discretion, we must
also try to promote the fair and efficient exercise of such discretion,
which we do in a variety of ways. When the IRS issues rules and
regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the APA
provides for transparency and public participation in the rulemaking
process, and the courts provide additional assurance that those rules
faithfully implement the tax laws.3 But the IRS's discretion is not
limited to APA rulemaking; the IRS also exercises discretion
informally in myriad ways. For example, it decides which areas of tax
law in which to issue regulations or other guidance, how to allocate
enforcement efforts among various activities or groups, and whether
f Professor of Law, Seattle University Law School. I am grateful to Ellen Aprill,
Steven Aikin, Gregory Colvin, John Kirkwood, and the participants of the 2013 Summer
Internal Workshop at Seattle University Law School for their helpful comments. I also
thank Seattle University law librarian Kelly Kunsch for his research assistance.
I See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2012)
(identifying complexity as the most serious problem facing taxpayers and the IRS).
2 See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1627-49 (1999).
:3 See generally PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF & CYNTHIA R. FARINA,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 238-76, 902-1098 (rev. 10th ed. 2003)
(describing the APA rulemaking process, the legal effect of administrative regulations,
and the courts' involvement). The IRS is not always as compliant with the APA as it
should be. See Kilstin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury's (Lack of)
Compliance with Administative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requitements, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
RV. 1727 (2007) [hereinafter Hickman, Coloring]. Moreover, the IRS issues not only APA
rules but also more informal guidance such as revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and
temporary regulations whose treatment under the APA is unclear. See Kristin E. Hickman,
Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 472-509 (2013) [hereinafter Hickman,
Unpacking].
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to litigate or appeal specific issues. 4  The exercise of discretion in
these informal ways is subject to oversight by congressionally created
bodies such as the U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration (TIGTA), the Taxpayer Advocate Service and the U.S.
Treasury IRS Oversight Board, and congressional committees such as
the House Committee on Government Oversight and Reform, and
the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight.
The recent Tea Party controversy presents a case study in which
to examine the IRS's informal exercise of discretion and observe the
operation of oversight mechanisms. As is well known, the controversy
erupted when TIGTA issued a report finding that IRS employees in
the Cincinnati office had targeted certain organizations' applications
for tax-exempt status for heightened scrutiny. In particular, the
employees singled out groups with "Tea Party" or "Patriot" in their
names.5 A media firestorm ensued with fevered speculation about a
hidden political agenda extending all the way to the White House."
President Obama fired the acting IRS Commissioner.7 Various
congressional committees held hearings." The FBI launched a
criminal investigation of the matter.'
A complete picture of the controversy has yet to emerge, but as
of the writing of this Essay, it appears that the worst suspicions about
political bias are unfounded. Thus far, there is no evidence of
4 See generally Jerry T. Masaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 96-97 (1985) (observing that the exercise of
administrative discretion includes such nonsubstantive criteria as determining and
prioritizing the regulatory agenda, setting priorities for enforcement, and formulating
rules and procedures for fact finding in order to apply legal rules).
5 See TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAx ADMIN., INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED
TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW (2013) [hereinafter TIGTA REPORT].
6 See, e.g., James Taranto, Nobody's Laughing Now: How Pervasive Is the Obama IRS
Scandal?, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2013),
http://online.wsj.coim/article/SB10001424127887323716304578481112854394652.html?
mod djemBestOfTheWeb h. For a day-by-day aggregation of mainstream media items
related to the "Tea Party scandal," including many of the scandalmongering sort, see Paul
Caron, The IRS Scandal, Day 75, TAxPROF BLOC (July 23, 2013),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof blog/2013/07/the-irs-16.html.
7 See Rebekah Metzler, Obama Fires IRS Chief in Wake of Scandal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (May 15, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/05/15/obama-fires-irs-
chief-in-wake-of-scandal-obama-fires-top-irs-official-in-wake-of-scandal.
8 At least five committees held hearings, including the Senate Finance Committee,
the House Ways and Means Committee, the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, and the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services
and General Government. See Josh Hicks, Five and Counting: Yet Another IRS Hearing,
WASH. POST (June 4, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.coim/blogs/federal-
eye/wp/2013/06/04/five-and-counting-yet-another-irs-hearing/.
9 See Kevin Johnson & Gregory Korte, FBI to Investigate Tea Party Tax Affair, USA
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intentional wrongdoing by IRS personnel or White House
involvement in the handling of the applications." The TIGTA
Report that prompted the controversy has been criticized as sloppy
and incomplete." It has since come to light that the IRS targeted
conservative political groups, liberal political groups, and a variety of
other groups for heightened scrutiny, although the TIGTA Report
omitted these facts." Congressional hearings have taken on the air of
a circus sideshow.13 The Washington Post issued a stern admonition to
politicians for "irresponsibly and repeatedly implying that a broad
political conspiracy to punish President Obama's enemies was finally
becoming visible, despite the fact that there was no evidence for that
conclusion and that bureaucratic bungling was a more likely
explanation,"1 4 while more self-reflective members of the media
10 See Sam Stein, Dan Pfeiffer: IRS Scandal Allegations Were 'Completely False',
HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2013, 12:20 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/31/dan-pfeiffer-irs-n-3682755.html; DANIEL
M ERFEL, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CHARTING A PATH FORWARD AT THE IRS: INITIAL
ASSESSMENT AND PLAN OF ACTION 6, 8 (2013), available at
http://www .irs.gov/pub/ne/ewsrooim/Initial%20Assessiment%2Oand%20Plan%20of%20Act
ion.pdf.
11 See Sam Stein, IRS Scandal Hearings Put Inspector General in the Spotlight,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2013, 2:24 PM),
http://wwx.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/17/irs-scandal n 3611460.htl; Martin A.
Sullivan, News Analysis: Substantial Minority of Scrutinized E~s Were Not Conservative,
TAXANALYSTS (May 30, 2013),
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/Articles/D2A6C735EAEA7A9085257B7B0
04COD90; Martin A. Sullivan, TIGTA Report Implies a Lot, Proves Little, About Bias at the IRS,
THE TAX ANALYSTS BLOG (May 28, 2013, 7:53 PM),
http://ww-.taxanalysts.corn/taxcom/taxblog.nsf/Perimalink/MSUN-
985RGV?OpenDocument.
12 See Letter from J. Russell George, Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., Dep't of the
Treasury, to Rep. Sander M. Levin, Ranking Member, Comm. on Ways and Means June
26, 2013), available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/TIGTA-
Final-Response-to-Rep-Levin-6-26-13.pdf.
13 See, e.g., Rebekah Metzler, Democrats Accuse Rep. Darrell Issa of McCarthyism During
Panel Vote on Lerner, U.S. News & World Rep. (June 28, 2013),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/06/28/democrats-accuse-rep-darrel-issa-of-
mccarthyism-duiring-panel-vote-on-lerner. Circus ringmaster Darrell Issa's relentless
attacks on the IRS and willful ignorance of any facts that might undermine his witch hunt
have been truly impressive. See Letter from Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking Minority
Member, Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, to Rep. Darrell E. Issa, Chairman,
Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform (July 17, 2013), available at
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/CummingsTolssa07l713.pdf (accusing
Representative Issa of creating a "skewed account based on partial, incomplete, and
cherry-picked information while disregarding key evidence that contradicts your political
narrative").
14 Editorial, The IRS Plot Thickens, WASH. POST (June 28, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-irs-plot-thickens/2013/06/28/8f813a06-
df72-11e2-b94a-452948b95ca8_story.html. For a different perspective, see The Washington
Post Aiding and Abetting Obama Cover-Up of IRS Targeting of Tea Pary, CONSERVATIVE HQ
(Aug. 4, 2013), http://www.conservativehq.com/article/14065-wNashington-post-aiding-
and-abetting-obama-cover-irs-targeting-tea-party.
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admonished themselves for their complicity in scandalmongering. 15
The evidence thus far indicates that the IRS may have been tone-deaf
and feckless but was not motivated by a political agenda.
To understand why the IRS handled tax-exempt applications the
way it did, it is necessary to understand the legal and factual
landscape related to the applications."h Most of the organizations at
issue had applied for IRS recognition as social welfare organizations-
sometimes called "(c) (4)s" in reference to the statute that provides
their tax exemption. 7 To qualify as a (c) (4), an organization must be
operated "exclusively for the promotion of social welfare,"' 8 defined
to be "the common good and general welfare of the people of the
community" and "bringing about civic betterments and social
improvements."1 9 The Sierra Club, AARP, and the NRA are well-
15 See Alex Seitz-Wald, How the Media Outrageously Blew the IRS Scandal: A Full
Accounting, SALON (July 8, 2013, 6:00 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2013/07/08/how-the-media-outrageously-blew-the-irs-scandal
a full accounting/.
16 This Essay provides a brief overview of certain aspects of an extremely complex
area of tax law. For detailed expositions of the law related to social welfare organizations
and political activity, see GREG COLVIN ET AL., COMMENTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF
THE EXEMPT ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE'S TASK FORCE ON SECTION 501(c) (4) AND
POLITICS (2004), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/tax/pubpolicy/2004/040525
exo.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter TASK FORCE COMMENTS]; Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating
the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION
L.J. 363, 375-93 (2011) [hereinafter Aprill, Regulating Political Speech]; see also JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, REPORT OF INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HANDLING OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION MATTERS 6, 122-
62 (2000) [hereinafterJCT REPORT] (finding "no credible evidence that the IRS delayed
or accelerated issuance of determination letters to tax-exempt organizations based on the
nature of the organization's perceived views."). For additional legal analysis of tax-exempt
organizations and political activity, see generally Ellen P. Aprill, MVy the IRS Should Want to
Develop Rules Regarding Charities and Politics, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 643 (2012)
[hereinafter Aprill, Rules]; Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposalfor Peaceful
Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308 (1990); Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organization
Advocacy: latching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201 (1988); Roger Colinvaux,
Regulation of Political Organizations and the Red Herring of Tax Exempt Status, 59 NAT'L TAX J.
531 (2006); Brian Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1561
(2013); Miriam Galston, Lobb ing and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal Revenue Code's
Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269 (1993); Oliver A. Houck, On the
Limits of Chanty: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral Politics by Charitable Organizations Under the
Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1 (2003); Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit
Legislative Speech: Aligning Poliy, Law, and Reality, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757 (2012);
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying: Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens
United, 10 Election L.J. 407 (2011); Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and
Charities: Hazardousfor501 (c)(3)s, Dangerousfor Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313 (2007).
17 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (4) (2006). Some of the organizations applied for exempt status
as charities under § 501(c) (3). See TIGTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 12 n.31.
18 26 U.S.C. §501(c) (4) (2006).
19 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2013). There is also an exclusionary
component to the definition of social welfare-it does not include promoting the private
benefit of the group's members or others. However, this requirement seems of little
consequence in determining limits on the political activity of social welfare organizations.
44 [Vol.99:41
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known examples of social welfare organizations.
As a condition to their tax-exempt status, social welfare
organizations must also comply with certain limits on their political
activity. Social welfare organizations are distinct from the more
familiar category of tax-exempt organizations referred to as charities,
which are organized and operated for religious, charitable,
educational, and other purposes.20 Charities are restricted in the
amount they may lobby-that is, to seek to influence legislation."
Furthermore, they are prohibited from engaging in campaign
interoention-that is, participation or intervention in any political
campaign for public office." In contrast, social welfare organizations
are free to lobby without limitation provided such lobbying furthers
the exempt purpose of promoting social welfare. 3 In addition,
unlike charities, social welfare organizations are not prohibited from
engaging in campaign intervention. 24 Rather, they are permitted to
engage in campaign intervention as long as it is not their primary
ac tivity. 2
Exactly how much campaign intervention a social welfare
organization can engage in without crossing the "primary activity"
threshold (and thus jeopardizing its tax-exempt status) is unclear. As
Mariam Galston summarizes, the courts might interpret the threshold
to mean "larger than de minimis but not too big"-somewhere in the
range of ten to fifteen percent of an organization's expenditures or
See TASK FORCE COMMENTS, Supra note 16, at 20-23.
20 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). These organizations are further categorized as
either public charities or private foundations, depending on the type of activities they
engage in or their sources of support. See id. § 509(a). The deductibility of contributions
to private foundations is more limited than for contributions to public charities.
Furthermore, private foundations are required to spend a certain amount of their income
currently and are taxed on certain types of income.
In addition to the different restrictions on political activity discussed here, another
important difference between charities and social welfare organizations is that donations
to charities are eligible for the charitable deduction while donations to social welfare
organizations are not. See id. § 170(c) (2).
21 Under 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c) (3), lobbying must be "no substantial part" of a charity's
activities. The specific limitations on lobbying depend on whether the charity is a public
charity or a private foundation, and whether it makes an election to be subject to special
rules under I.R.C. § 501(h) establishing a safe harbor for lobbying amounts. SeeJCT
REPORT, supra note 16, at 135-53.
22 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3) (2006).
23 See Aprill, Regulating Political Speech, supra note 16, at 375-77.
24 The statute requires that a social welfare organization be operated "exclusively" for
the promotion of social welfare. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (4) (2006). However, the IRS has
interpreted this requirement to mean that the social welfare organization must be
"primarily engaged" in the promotion of social welfare. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c) (4)-
1(a) (2) (i) (2013).
A social welfare organization is subject to tax on its investment income to the extent that it
engages in campaign intervention. See 26 U.S.C. § 527(f) (2006).
25 See id.
2013] 45
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activities. 2 ' However, as Galston also notes, the IRS seems to take a
more liberal position, although it has never set out a specific
percentage, and some practitioners argue that the threshold is as
high as forty or even forty-nine percent. 7 The only certainty is that
there is no bright line demarcating an acceptable percentage of
campaign intervention activity.28
Even more problematic than the indeterminate "primary
activity" threshold is the subjective facts-and-circumstances test used
to determine whether an activity constitutes campaign intervention as
opposed to lobbying or some other permitted activity.29 The very
same activity might be considered campaign intervention or not,
depending on a multitude of factors.30 For example, whether a
candidate forum constitutes campaign intervention might depend on
factors including whether multiple candidates for the same office are
invited; whether the organization indicates support or opposition to
one or more candidates; whether political fundraising occurs;
whether a nonpartisan panel formulates the questions posed to the
candidates; whether the topics cover a broad range of issues that are
of interest to the public; and whether candidates are asked to agree
or disagree with positions, platforms, agendas, or statements of the
organization. 31
Historically, most social welfare organizations did not
aggressively push the limits on the campaign intervention activity
described above. Some groups, such as the Sierra Club or the NRA,
might engage quite actively in lobbying but would limit their
campaign intervention activities. 2 However, the majority of social
26 See Mariam Galston, Vision Service Plan v. U.S.: Implications for Campaign Activities of
501(c)(4)s, 53 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 165, 167, 167 n.20 (2006).
27 See id. at 167-69; see also TASK FORCE COMMENTS, supra note 16, at 39-43
(analyzing the extent of political activity permissible for § 501 (c) (4) organizations).
28 In addition, even if there were a fixed numeric percentage for "primary activity,"
determining what proportion of an organization's activities consist of campaign
intervention would still involve complex allocation questions depending on how much
time or money, directly or indirectly, the organization spends on campaign intervention
versus other activities. See TASK FORCE COMMENTS, supra note 16, at 45-50; ef 26 C.F.R. §
56.4911-3 (2013) (setting out allocation rules for purposes of the tax on excessive
lobbying expenditures by public charities).
29 See TASK FORCE COMMENTS, supra note 16, at 23-38; Aprill, Regulating Political
Speech, supra note 16, at 381-87.
30 See Gregory L. Colvin, Political Tax Law After Citizens United: A Tie for Reform, 66
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 71, 72 (2010).
31 See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1423; Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328; see
also Colvin, supra note 30, at 72-79 (illustrating through a hypothetical the intractability of
the multifactor test and proposing reforms that would increase certainty and provide safe
harbors).
32 Both the Sierra Club and the NRA have affiliated 527 organizations that engage in
campaign intervention. For discussion of 527 organizations, see infra notes 34-42 and
accompanying text. Like many well-known tax-exempt organizations, they also have
46 [Vol.99:41
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welfare organizations-groups like The Lumbejack World
Championships Foundation and The Ballroom Latin and Swing
Dance Association-engaged in little or no political activity of any
kind.33 Instead, if a group planned to engage primarily in campaign
intervention, it would organize as a 527 organization (named after the
section of the tax law that governs such groups).
By definition, 527 organizations-typically including PACs,
candidates' campaign committees, and political parties-engage
primarily in campaign intervention.3 4  During the 1990s, coincident
with the rise of super wealthy individual political donors, 527
organizations became popular as vehicles for unregulated campaign
money. 6 They were dubbed "stealth PACs" because the tax law did
not require them to disclose the identity of donors, nor were they
subject to campaign finance law reporting and donor disclosure
requirements.16  One of the most notorious of these 527
affiliated public charities. This "hybrid structure" enables them to solicit tax-deductible
contributions to their public charities, engage freely in lobbing through their social
welfare organizations, and participate in campaign intervention through their 527 arms.
33 SeeJeff Kiehely & Kendall Golladay, The Scope and Activities of 501 (c) (4) Social
Welfare Organizations: Fact Versus Fantasy 14, 16 (2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (finding that in 2000, only 818 of approximately 22,000 social welfare
organizations listed advocacy as one of their three primary activities in their filings with
the IRS).
34 See 26 U.S.C. § 527 (2006). Technically, these groups are defined primarily to
engage in activities related to their "exempt function," which is defined as "influencing or
attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any
individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or office in a political organization,
or the election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential electors." Id. § 527(e) (2). Most
experts think that "exempt function" is very similar to but not co-terminous with
"campaign intervention." See TASK FORCE COMMENTS, supra note 16, at 24-35; Aprill,
Regulating Political Speech, supra note 16, at 382-84.
527 organizations are partially tax-exempt: contributions they receive are exempt
from tax, but other income, such as investment income, is taxed. SeeJCT REPORT, supra
note 16, at 123.
35 For a detailed account of stealth PACs and their role in electoral campaign
finance, see Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem ... and the Buckle Problem, 73 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 949 (2005).
36 Briffault sums up the unique "best of all worlds" status of 527 organizations as
follows:
In the late 1990s, politically active interest groups flourished in the
regulatory gap between the Internal Revenue Code and FECA. These
organizations were able to argue successfully both that their issue
advocacy and other electoral activities were sufficiently election-related to
qualify for section 527 tax-exempt treatment, but not sufficiently election-
related to trigger FECA's disclosure requirements and other rules. These
politically active organizations could enjoy tax-exempt status, sidestep
FECA's limitations and requirements, avoid section 501(c)'s primary
purpose cap on campaign activities, and benefit from the gift tax
exemption for donations to 527 organizations, to boot. Section 527
quickly became the campaign finance vehicle of choice for many interest
groups in the late 1990s.
See id. at 958-59.
2013] 47
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organizations was Republicans for Clean Air, which ran political ads
against John McCain in the Republican primary leading up to the
2000 presidential election. George W. Bush won both the
Republican primary and the general election. It was later revealed
that Republicans for Clean Air was funded by the Texas billionaire
brothers Sam and Charles Wyly, major Bush supporters.3 7
The "best of all worlds" status of 527 organizations came to an
end in 2000, when Congress amended the tax law to require 527
organizations to disclose their donors. 8 Legal experts predicted that
political strategists would shift their activities from 527 organizations
to social welfare organizations, which are not required to disclose
their donors.Y However, it was not until the Supreme Court's 2010
decision in Citizens United0 that the number of groups applying for
exempt status as social welfare organizations increased dramatically. 41
Citizens United freed corporations and unions to spend unlimited
amounts in elections and prompted the formation of politically active
social welfare organizations such as Crossroads GPS, which was
founded by Karl Rove in 2010 and spent at least $70 million in the
2012 election cycle. 42
37 See Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code,
37 GA. L. REV. 611, 614-16 (2003).
38 See Act to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Require 527
Organizations to Disclose Their Political Activities, Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477
(2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-276, 116 Stat. 1929 (2002). As the code has been
amended, 527 organizations with anticipated receipts of less than $25,000 per year,
organizations that already file with the Federal Election Commission (FEC), and
organizations engaged solely in state and local electoral activity that report and disclose
their contributions and expenditures under a qualifying state law regime need not file
with the IRS. See id. at 2 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 527(e) (5), () (5) (C) (2006)).
39 Frances R. Hill, Probing the Limits of Section 527 to Design a New Campaign Vehicle, 86
TAx NOTES 387, 400 (2000); Daniel L. Simmons, An Essay on Federal Income Taxation and
Campaign Finance Reformc, 54 FLA. L. REV. 1, 81 (2002).
It was thought that the benefits of donor anonymity for social welfare organizations
would be offset by the possibility that donations would be subject to the gift tax. In
contrast, donations to 527 organizations are explicitly not exempt from the gift tax. See
Hill, supra note 39, at 389-90. However, this concern has been laid to rest at least for the
time being, as the IRS has announced that it will not try to impose the gift tax on
donations made to social welfare organizations. See Ellen P. Aprill, Once and Future Gift
Taxation of Transfers to Section 501 (c)(4) Organizations: Current Law, Constitutional Issues, and
Policy Considerations, 15 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 289, 292 (2012).
40 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
41 See Aprill, Regulating Political Speech, supra note 16, at 363-64. The number of
social welfare organization applications received by the IRS nearly doubled from the year
2010 to 2012, from 1,735 to 3,357. See TIGTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
42 It reported expenditures of nearly $71 million during the 2012 federal election
cycle. See Crossroads GPS Independent Expenditures, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/indexpend.php?cycle=2012&cmite=C90011719 (last
visited Sept. 1, 2013). One estimate, however, puts Crossroad GPS's total spending at over
$100 million. See Jacob Fention, Karl Rove's Super PAC Breaks $100 Million in Spending,
SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION REPORTING GROUP (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:02 AM),
http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2012/karl-roves-super-pac-passes-100-million-
48 [Vol.99:41
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In light of this background, it becomes clear that the IRS faced a
challenging and delicate task in determining whether applicants
qualified as social welfare organizations. It had to ascertain whether
and to what extent the applicant engaged in campaign intervention,
as defined under a subjective, multifactor inquiry that required
detailed information about the nature and circumstances of the
applicant's activities. With limited personnel and thousands of
applications to process,43 the IRS made the ill-advised decision to use
words such as "Tea Party" and "Patriot" (and also, as has come to
light, words such as "Occupy" and "Progressive"4 4 ) to identify groups
that were likely to be politically active and whose applications would
then be subject to heightened scrutiny.45
The IRS's ineptitude added credibility to the allegations of
unfair targeting: confusion and lack of clarity within the IRS about
how to handle the applications-perhaps compounded by a fear of
incurring the wrath of powerful members of Congress4 6-led to
inconsistent treatment, undue delays, and intrusive information
requests. 47  Bureaucratic bungling48 aside, however, allegations of
spending/.
4T The IRS receives about 70,000 tax-exempt applications each year, several thousand
of which are social welfare applications. The initial processing of all applications is
handled by fewer than 200 employees in the Cincinnati office. See Internal Revenue Serv.,
Questions and Answers on 501(c) Organizations, IRS.GOV (May 15, 2013),
http://ww.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Questions-and-Answers-on-501%28c%29-
Organizations; see also Kim Barker & Justin Elliott, How the IPSs Nonprofit Division Got So
Dysfunctional, PROPUBLICA (May 17, 2013, 5:14 PM),
http://www .propublica.org/article/how-irs-nonprofit-division-got-so-dysfunctional
(describing dysfunction in the Cincinnati office of the IRS).
44 See Letter from J. Russell George, supra note 12; Jonathan Weisman, LR.S. Scrutiny
Went Beyond the Political, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.coim/2013/07/05/us/politics/irs-scrutiny-wxent-beyond-the-
political.html?pagewanted all&_ r0.
45 Moreover, the heightened scrutiny involved seeking information about the nature
and extent of groups' political activities that, while legally necessary, seemed overly




46 Norm Ornstein describes how in 2011, the IRS floated the idea of imposing gift
taxes on donors' contributions to social welfare organizations as a way to curb what
Ornstein characterizes as "an obvious and in-your-face flouting of the intent of the law
and even of the regulations." See Norm Ornstein, The IRS Scandal Isn't About Taxes-It's
About Disclosure, THE ATLANTIC, (May 23, 2013, 11:17 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/05/the-irs-scandal-isnt-about-taxes-its-
about-disclosure/276166/. The proposal was quickly shut down by a letter of protest from
six Republican senators, including four members of the Finance Committee, which
oversees the IRS. See id. As Ornstein sums up, "[t]hese senators have enormous power
over the IRS, and the implication of the letter was clear: Go any further on this, and there
will be hell to pay." See id.
47 See TIGTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 5-21; NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, SPECIAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS: POLITICAL ACTITY AND THE RIGHTS OF APPLICANTS FOR
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political bias may have been inevitable given the political minefield
the IRS was tasked to navigate. Indeed, in 2000, one Treasury official
predicted exactly this result:
Imposition of such a burden on the IRS would be an
administrative nightmare for the agency. The IRS does not have
adequate resources to take on this difficult and politically sensitive
role of regularly monitoring campaign activities and disclosure
reports. The IRS would inevitably be subject to claims of
discrimination and political bias for actions taken or not taken.4 9
Allegations of political bias and targeting by the IRS must be
taken seriously. They have a long history and sometimes prove true. 5
Today, given the increased polarization of U.S. politics, they are even
more likely to occur. In this particular case, it was predictable and
possibly unavoidable that the IRS would be accused of political bias.
At the same time, however, politically fraught situations such as this
one virtually guarantee by their very nature that the IRS will be highly
scrutinized and that potential targets will receive adequate
protection. As the Tea Party controversy shows, when political bias is
alleged, hearings will be held, investigations will be launched, reports
will be written, and no stone will go unturned to discover any hint
that the IRS may have abused its discretion.
That is not to say there are not serious problems with the way in
which the IRS exercised its discretion in this case. The IRS's central
function-to raise revenue to finance the government-is of vital
importance. Allegations of bias and revelations of bureaucratic
incompetence threaten the legitimacy of the IRS, which undermines
the entire tax system. Furthermore, the IRS may be chilled from
enforcing the tax laws for fear of political fallout, while at the same
TAX-EXEMPT STATUS 14-22 (2013) [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT]; WERFEL, supra note 10,
at 9-10.
48 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
49 Memorandum from Steve Aikin, U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Policy June 13,
2000) (on file with author), reproduced in Sam Stein, IRS Scandal Predicted in June 2000
Treasury Memo, HLFFINGTON POST (une 21, 2013, 12:37 PM),
http://mww.hiffingtonpost.com/2013/06/20/irs-scandal-treasury-steve-
atkins n3473110.html; see also Alex Seitz-Wald, How Boehner Helped Create IRS Scandal 13
Years Ago, SALON (uly 11, 2013, 4:05 PM),
http://mww.salon.com/2013/07/11/boehner-inadvertently-helped-start-irs-scandal13
years-ago (discussing how H.R. 4762 put the IRS in the position of having to determine
"whether nonprofit advocacy groups would be required to disclose their donors because
too much of their activities crossed the theoretical line between 'issues advocacy' and
'political campaign intervention"').
5o SeeJOHN A. ANDREW III, THE POWER TO DESTROY: THE POLITICAL USES OF THE IRS
FROM KENNEDY TO NIXON (2002).
The allegations of political bias in the current controversy are quite similar to those
leveled against the IRS during the Clinton Administration. At the direction of Congress,
the Joint Committee on Taxation investigated the charges and concluded there was no
basis for the accusations. SeeJCT REPORT, supra note 16.
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time, some taxpayers may be emboldened to flout the law because
they perceive the IRS to be set back on its heels.5' In addition,
controversies such as this provide ammunition to antitax lawmakers
in their quest to defund the IRS and further impair compliance and
collection efforts.52
If we wish to minimize the risk of such costly mistakes in the
future, what insights can we gain from the Tea Party controversy
about strategies to improve the exercise of IRS discretion? Peter
Shuck enumerates a range of techniques for controlling
administrative discretion: (1) political controls through presidential
and congressional review, (2) processual controls through public
participation, (3) legal controls through review by courts and
specialized tribunals, (4) managerial controls through professional
and managerial norms, and (5) programmatic controls through market
oriented discipline. This taxonomy helps to characterize some of
the policy prescriptions and directions for future research that
emerge from the Tea Party controversy.
Political controls worked perhaps too well in the case of the Tea
Party controversy. Congress exerted control over the IRS in a variety
of ways: it created TIGTA to provide independent oversight of the
IRS.54 TIGTA conducted its investigation at the request of Members
of Congress.55 Upon publication of the TIGTA report, at least five
congressional committees held hearings and conducted further
investigations. These overlapping congressional control mechanisms
ensured that allegations of IRS discretionary abuse would be
thoroughly investigated. However, the costs of these control
mechanisms-the reputational damage to the IRS and the collateral
consequences-are too high. We would do better to avoid giving the
IRS responsibilities that are apt to be politically controversial, even if
the risk of abuse is low and even if other agencies are not necessarily
51 Anecdotes are circulating in the practice community that taxpayers want to take
more aggressive positions in the wake of the controversy, reasoning that the IRS will be
too cowed to object.
52 See Charles S. Clark, House Appropriators Slash IRS Budget in Wake of Scandal, GOV'T
EXEC. (July 9, 2013), http://www.govexec.com/management/2013/07/house-
appropriators-slash-irs-budget-wake-scandal/66311/ (describing a proposal to cut the IRS
budget by twenty-four percent and withhold ten percent of enforcement spending unless
the IRS implements the recommendations of the TIGTAREPORT).
53 See PETER H. SCHLCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw4 176-82 (2d ed.
2013).
54 TIGTA was established under the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. Its
mission is to "provide independent oversight of IRS activities," "prevent[ing] and
detect[ing] . . . fraud, waste, and abuse within the IRS and related entities." TREASUIRY
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION,
http://wwwx.treasury.gov/tigta/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
55 See TIGTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
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better equipped to carry out these responsibilities.6 Of course, it is
impossible for the IRS to avoid controversy entirely, and for some,
the very existence of a tax system seems to have become a political
flash point. However, Congress ought to be more cognizant that
these controversies impose great costs on the tax system.
Unfortunately, this warning probably comes too late for the
implementation of the Affordable Care Act, in which the IRS will play
a major role. Building on the Tea Party controversy, political attacks
on the IRS and its role in the new healthcare law have already
begun.?
Processual techniques such as public participation can be a
valuable control mechanism, although the IRS has been reluctant to
embrace them.5 8 Theoretically, the IRS could submit informal
guidelines, such as those for processing tax-exempt applications, to
an APA-like notice-and-comment process.5 ' While this would achieve
a heightened level of transparency and accountability, this level of
process might be too cumbersome or otherwise inappropriate in
some cases. In these cases, the IRS should consider intermediate
levels of process. For example, the TIGTA Report made a
recommendationo-which the IRS accepted-that the IRS set forth
its processes for handling tax-exempt applications in the Internal
56 Specifically with respect to the regulation of political activity involved in the Tea
Party controversy, Lloyd Mayer concludes that but for the risk of regulatory capture, the
FEC is better equipped than the IRS to carry out the regulatory task. See Lloyd H. Mayer,
The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REv. 625, 683 (2007). Mayer
observes that the IRS is less susceptible to political capture than the FEC in part because
the IRS is protective of its reputation as a neutral and fair tax collector. See id. at 675. My
argument is that reputational damage to the IRS is extremely costly and ought to be
avoided wherever possible. This prescription complements the literature criticizing tax
expenditures-social and economic spending programs implemented through the tax
law-and calling for tax reforms that focus the IRS on its core function. See, e.g., Linda
Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive justice, 3 COLLM. J. TAx L. 1, 3 (2011)
("Serious proposals for tax reform are on the table, and they share a simple, fundamental
approach to reshaping the law: strip the Code of the myriad special deductions, credits
and exclusions that allow individuals and corporations to reduce their tax liability.").
57 See, e.g., Sandy Fitzgerald, Gingrich: IRS Targeting Scandal Raises Issues About
Obamacare, NEWSMAX (May 13, 2013, 10:57 AM),
http://www.newssmax.com/newsfront/gingrich-irs-obamacare-
tea/ 2013/05/13/id/504157; Robert Pear, House Votes to Bar I.R.S. Action on Health Law,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/is/politics/house-
votes-to-bar-irs-from-enforcing-health-law.html?_r=0 ("'The I.R.S. has been abusing its
power by targeting and punishing American citizens for their political beliefs,' said
Representative Eric Cantor of Virginia, the majority leader. . . . 'The last thing we should
do is to allow the I.R.S. to play such a central role in our health care.').
58 See Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3; Rimma Tsvasman, No More Excuses: A Case for
the IRSs Full Compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 837, 843-49
(2011).
59 Such guidelines are not rules governed by the APA. See Hickman, Unpacking, supra
note 3, at 492-508.
60 See TIGTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 10-11.
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Revenue Manual, an internal compilation of IRS guidelines and
practices that is publicly available.l
Legal control of administrative discretion, through judicial
review, is a subject of much uncertainty and complexity when it
comes to the IRS,62 a full exploration of which is beyond the scope of
this Essay. One central legal issue in the Tea Party controversy is
whether the Treasury regulation defining a social welfare
organization as one "primarily engaged " in the promotion of social
welfare impermissibly modifies the statutory requirement that such
an organization be operated "exclusively" for the promotion of social
welfare. Some commentators have asserted that the IRS
interpretation of the statute is illegal and that the Tea Party
controversy would not have arisen had the IRS acted within the
boundaries of the law.63 Legal scholars take a more nuanced view of
the IRS interpretation, 4 but the validity of the regulation has never
been challenged in court. If judicial review is supposed to provide a
safeguard against the possibility of interpretive abuse, questions to be
explored include why it failed to operate as a check on administrative
discretion in this case, to what extent it succeeds or fails in other
contexts, and whether it can be improved as a control mechanism for
administrative discretion.65
Managerial control of administrative discretion-through the
development of professional and managerial norms-was clearly
deficient in the Tea Party controversy. The enhancement of such
norms holds much promise as a means to achieve better
administration. To the extent feasible, the IRS should be methodical
61 See generally Archie W. Parnell, Jr., The Internal Revenue lanual: Its Utility and Legal
Effect, 32 TAx L. 687 (1979) (describing and analyzing the Internal Revenue Manual).
62 See Hickman, Unpacking, supra note 3; Leandra Lederman, What Do Cowts Have to
Do With It?: The Judiciary's Role in Making Federal Tax Law, 65 NAT'L TAX J. 889, 906-10
(2012).
63 See Evan Puschak, O'Donnell: The Real IRS Scandal Happened in 1959, MSNBC.COM
(May 13, 2013, 10:47 PM), http://ty.msnbc.com/2013/05/13/odonnell-the-real-irs-
scandal-happened-in-1959/; see also Ornstein, supra note 46 (arguing that the IRS reacted
to strong political pressure from Republican lawmakers).
64 See Galston, supra note 26, at 166-69; Ellen P. April], The IRS's Tea Party Tax Row:
How Exclusively' Became 'Primarily', PACIFIC STANDARD (June 7, 2013),
http://www.psmag.coim/politics/the-irss-tea-party-tax-row-howx-exclusively-became-
primarily-59451/.
65 Scholars have identified and analyzed a handful of other cases where Treasury
regulations may have exceeded statutory authority. See Samuel D. Brunson, Watching the
Watchers: Preventing LR.S. Abuse of the Tax System, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 223 (2013); Lederman,
supra note 62, at 906-13; Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasuy Overrule the Supreme Court? 84 B.U.
L. REV. 185 (2004); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Can the Treasury Exempt Its Own
Companies from Tax? The $45 Billion GM NOL Cart fomvard, I CATO PAPERS ON PUB. POL'Y 1
(2011); Sunil Shenoi, Undoing Undue Favors: Providing Competitors with Standing to Challenge
Favorable IRS Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORm 531 (2010); Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and
the Rule of Law in the Administiation of the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829 (2012).
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and transparent about its internal processes when the exercise of
discretion is involved. The Taxpayer Advocate Service has made
valuable suggestions along these lines-recommending, for example,
that the IRS consult with taxpayers and other stakeholders in
formulating procedures and post them on the Internet.66
Another managerial technique that the IRS should explore is to
adopt "best practices" in its rulemaking that will operate to limit its
discretion. In the Tea Party controversy, the IRS interpreted the law
in a manner that gave it expansive discretion,67 which in turn led to
bureaucratic failures in the exercise of that discretion. One way the
IRS could avoid such bureaucratic failures would be to "self-police,"
that is, consciously interpret and implement the law in ways that limit,
rather than expand, its discretion. With respect to the specific laws
implicated in the Tea Party controversy, some experts have made
exactly this recommendation, proposing that the subjective,
multifactor approach of the IRS be replaced by a more "bright-line"
test."8 An important avenue for future research to explore is whether
recommendations of this type-for example, to use bright-line rules
rather than subjective or multifactor standards-should be adopted
more broadly by the IRS as professional and managerial norms.Q
The Tea Party controversy inflicted needless damage on the IRS
and distracted lawmakers from their more important responsibilities.
A cynic might say that the only good it did was to sell a lot of
newspapers. However, the controversy also presents an opportunity
to explore strategies to ensure that the IRS exercises its power wisely,
thereby enhancing its integrity and legitimacy. This Essay begins that
66 See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 18-21 (2013). But see Brunson, supra note
65, at 245-54 (arguing that the Taxpayer Advocate Service and the IRS Oversight
Committee cannot adequately protect against IRS abuse of discretion); Heather B.
Conoboy, A Wrong Step in the Right Direction: The National Taxpayer Advocate and the 1998 IRS
Restructuring and Reformt Act, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1401, 1409-16 (2000) (arguing that
the Taxpayer Advocate Service's mission is too focused on remedying specific instances of
abuse of discretion and does not address systemic problems at the IRS).
67 The IRS expanded its discretion in two ways. First, it interpreted the statute's
requirement that groups be operated "exclusively" to promote social welfare to mean that
they must be "primarily engaged" in the promotion of social welfare. Second, it
interpreted "campaign intervention" to be determined by subjective, multi-factor tests. See
supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
68 See TASK FORCE COMMENTS, supra note 16, at 43-51; April], Pules, supra note 16, at
682-83; The Bright Line Project: Clarifying IRS Rules on Political Intervention, Drafting
Committee Explanation (Interim Draft July 12, 2013),
http://mww.citizen.org/documents/BLP-clarifying-irs-rules-on-political-intervention.pdf.
The IRS has adopted a bright-line approach in the aftermath of the Tea Party
controversy, proposing a safe harbor for organizations whose campaign intervention
activity is less than forty p682ercent and whose social welfare activity exceeds sixty percent.
See WERFEL, supra note 10, at 25.
69 See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J.
65 (1983) (describing and analyzing regulatory "precision").
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exploration in the hopes that a better and stronger IRS will emerge.
